How to Succeed at Increasing Spending without Really Trying: The Balanced Budget Amendment and the Item Veto

Matthew J Gabel and Gregory L Hager

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 102, issue 1-2, 19-23

Abstract: Congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending. In particular, the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents' interests through pork-barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest. However, assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests, we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results. The supermajorities requires by the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log-rolling that promote--and may indeed increase--pork-barrel spending. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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