Political Shirking, Opponent Quality, and Electoral Support

David Figlio

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 103, issue 3-4, 84 pages

Abstract: Several recent papers in the public choice literature suggest that legislators shirk, or vote in a manner contrary to constituent interest. This paper explores the relationship between senatorial shirking and electoral consequences. I model political shirking, opponent quality and election outcomes as simultaneous, and find significant evidence of a relationship between shirking over the senatorial term and electoral outcomes. However, I find that voters punish recent shirking much more than they punish early-term shirking, and that senators apparently act consistently with this relationship. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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