Behavioral and Institutional Determinants of Political Business Cycles

Rui Baleiras () and Vasco Santos

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 104, issue 1-2, 47 pages

Abstract: The link between business cycles and the democratic political system has long been recognized by economists. However, the determinants of political business cycles are not well understood. We discuss several institutional and behavioral determinants of those cycles, such as revolving-door appointments, term limits and preferences of the incumbent politician, electorate and business community concerning the intertemporal pattern of public expenditure. We show how they affect the cycle's amplitude in the context of a rational-expectations model. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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