Determinants of Automobile PAC Contributions to House Incumbents: Own versus Rival Effects

Philip L Hersch and Gerald S McDougall

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 104, issue 3-4, 329-43

Abstract: This paper examines PAC contributions by the Big Three U.S. automakers and Japanese auto dealers to House incumbents. A regression model is estimated where PAC contributions are a function of a firm's own ties to an incumbent's district (as measured by firm employment) and those of rivals. For the Big Three, own and U.S. rival effects are positive. Further, the results do not indicate the presence of a free-rider effect. Employment by a foreign subsidiary has no net effect on U.S. contributions. For the Japanese dealers, Japanese plant employment has a positive impact on contributions, and that of the Big Three a negative. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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