On the Formation of Family Structures

Evelyn Korn

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 105, issue 3-4, 357-72

Abstract: Hitherto, models of family economics focus on explaining the organization of monogamous and polygynous family patterns. A third existing marriage pattern, polyandrous marriages, has been neglected. This paper shows that--in contrast to the common view--a polyandrous marriage may be individually rational. I consider a game theoretic model of a subsistence economy whose members maximize their personal reproductive success. In this model, all three family formations can appear as equilibrium solutions. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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