Representation, Voluntary Retirement, and Shirking in the Last Term

Charles Tien

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 106, issue 1-2, 117-30

Abstract: There is disagreement over whether or not representatives shirk. Previous studies, however, have used raw interest group scores that do not allow for accurate comparisons over time. I take advantage of recently published indexed ADA scores by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) that adjust for temporal differences to test for shirking. I compare results from adjusted ADA scores to Poole and Rosenthal's Nominate scores. With a simple, straightforward test of dyadic representation, I provide additional evidence that shirking exists among voluntarily retiring members of Congress. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:106:y:2001:i:1-2:p:117-30

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().