Optimal Intergenerational Redistribution in a Two-Country Model with Endogenous Fertility

Martin Kolmar ()

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 106, issue 1-2, 23-51

Abstract: We analyze a model with two countries that are linked by an integrated capital market. Fertility, and thus population growth, is endogenously determined by households. Our analysis proceeds in three steps: First, we characterize an optimal intertemporal and interregional allocation in a model with endogenous fertility and two countries. Second, we look for an institution supporting the optimal allocation. It turns out that in general, a decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. National public-pension systems with benefits that are related to the number of children implements the optimal allocation. This provides a justification for government interventions beyond its role as a "night-watchman." Third, we analyze whether national governments have the right incentives to implement the optimal system. It turns out that every national government has an incentive to deviate from the optimal structure and to shift part of the burden to the other country. Policy implications for the institutional arrangements within the European Union are discussed. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:106:y:2001:i:1-2:p:23-51

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().