Productivity Growth and the Political Economy of Social Security

Berthold Wigger ()

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 106, issue 1-2, 53-76

Abstract: The present paper provides an analysis of unfunded social security as the outcome of a public decision making process in an endogenous growth economy. It employs a model in which there is a non-monotonic relationship between productivity growth and the scale of public intergenerational redistribution. The paper shows that although unfunded social security need not harm growth in general, it is likely to harm growth in a democracy. This effect is reinforced by population aging. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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