Between Appeasement and Belligerent Moralism: The Evolution of Moral Conduct in International Politics

Ulrich Witt

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 106, issue 3-4, 365-88

Abstract: What are the conditions for "moral" conduct in international politics to be viable? This question is explored by modeling regional conflicts as a two-stage game in which imitation of other countries' strategies and public opinion formation processes are assumed to have an impact on a country's strategic choice. The results derived by using the notion of an evolutionary stable strategy point to some very special conditions for moral conduct to emerge and survive, a fact that may explain the historical finding that there have been rather rare periods during which peaceableness did indeed prevail in international politics, at least at a regional level. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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