Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?

Mehmet Bac

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 107, issue 1, 87-96

Abstract: A higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders' information about the identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance incentives to establish “connections” for corruption. The connections effect may dominate the detection effect for local improvement in transparency and generate an increase in corruption, a prediction sharply in contrast with standard theories of transparency. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1010349907813 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene? (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:107:y:2001:i:1:p:87-96

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1023/A:1010349907813

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().