Loyal Political Cartels and Committee Assignments in Congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

Franklin Mixon and Rand Ressler ()

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 108, issue 3-4, 313-30

Abstract: This study presents a political model which suggests that monopoly legislators form cartel-like organizations (referred to as "memberships") in an effort to extract greater benefits in the political process. Based on a model by Coker and Crain (1994) that provides theoretical and statistical arguments for congressional committees as loyalty-generating institutions, the instant research examines committee placement of "members" of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in the U.S. House by Democrat leaders. Voting records indicate that the CBC is uniform in its voting patterns, indicating cartel-like behavior. Because of this, the Democratic leadership in the House chooses to place CBC members on important committees in order to support their policy agenda. The general finding of this study is that "black representation" may be greater than simply the proportion of seats held by black Representatives. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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