Formal Human Capital Attainment of Career Legislators in the U.S. Congress: Modeling Legislatures As Unions

Franklin Mixon

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 108, issue 3-4, 369-86

Abstract: The present paper employs a human capital model that examines, among other things, the educational attainment of career politicians/legislators. Statistical evidence is presented which suggests that the formal educational levels differ systematically between career and non-career politicians/legislators at the federal level (i.e., in the U.S. Congress)--a result consistent with the implications of the legislative pay union model developed by McCormick and Tollison (1978). Any adverse selection consequences are potentially significant regarding the quality of federal legislation and the social cost of government activities. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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