Defending the Articles of Confederation: A Response to Sobel

Keith L Dougherty

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 109, issue 1-2, 48 pages

Abstract: A fundamental mystery of the Articles of Confederation is why the states contributed sizeable resources to the confederation government when they were allegedly caught in a collective action problem. In a recent article, Russel Sobel denies the collective action problem and suggests that our research on the incentive structure of the confederation contradicts the evidence. This note clarifies both of our arguments, introduces the type of evidence that would determine whether national public goods were sub-optimally supplied, and explains why states contributed in a manner that is consistent with the evidence and with a deficient institutional design. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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