Lobbying and Concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg Games

Gil Epstein and Carsten Hefeker

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 109, issue 1-2, 175-81

Abstract: We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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