Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission

James M De Vault
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: James Michael DeVault

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 110, issue 1-2, 22 pages

Abstract: This study examines the unfair trade decisions of the International Trade Commission (ITC) and how they have been affected by Congress. It begins by identifying the means Congress can use to influence ITC decisions and then estimates both the extent to which these means have been used and the extent to which they have shaped the ITC's behavior. The study reaches two conclusions. First, Congress has tried to shape the ITC's behavior, but it has not tried to micromanage this behavior. Second, while the ITC's behavior has been influenced by Congress, congressional influence is not as important as other factors, such as statutory criteria. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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