Lowering the Cost of Pollution Control versus Controlling Pollution: A Comment

Michael Brooks

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 110, issue 1-2, 163-72

Abstract: Dwight Lee (1999) shows that the collectivity may be better, not worse off, when a technically "inefficient" pollution abatement technology is adopted. The purpose of this note is two fold. First, to show that once rent-seeking is incorporated into the analysis, Lee's qualified support for a technically inefficient pollution abatement technology is at best problematic, and at worst flawed. Second, to demonstrate that it is possible to make a less problematic normative case in favour of the adoption of the technically inefficient abatement policy. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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