The Supply of University Enrollments: University Administrators as Utility Maximizing Bureaucrats

Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 110, issue 3-4, 365-92

Abstract: The supply of enrollments in higher education has received relatively little attention in both theoretical and empirical economic research. To address this, we formulate and test a model of the supply of enrollments in higher education in which administrators are modeled as utility maximizing bureaucrats. We find evidence that individual presidents and provosts have a significant effect on enrollment supply and faculty demand in a panel of eleven public colleges and universities in Maryland from 1988 to 1996, implying that institutions have enough market power to permit the preferences of administrators to influence enrollment supply and faculty demand. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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