Non-Discriminatory, Envy Free Provision of a Collective Good

Werner Guth and Hartmut Kliemt

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 111, issue 1-2, 179-84

Abstract: In a setting in which the provision of a collective good is at stake the "principle of generality as equal treatment" is related to the concept of "envy free net trades". This leads to an operational formulation of the fundamental liberal aim of non-discriminatory politics in terms of stated preferences or bids. Starting from such bids a simple axiomatic justification for "schematically equal taxes" (everyone pays the same amount) is given. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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