On 'Home Grown-Ness' in Politics: Evidence from the 1998 Election For Alabama's Third Congressional District

Scott A Kjar and David Laband ()

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 112, issue 1-2, 143-50

Abstract: Faith and Tollison (1983) argue that since it is costly to "fire" a representative for poor performance, voters will rationally prefer local candidates with longstanding ties to the district. Such candidates implicitly put more specific human or other types of capital at risk as a Klein and Leffler (1981) type of performance bond than do other candidates with lesser ties to the district. Voters understand and appreciate the implied efficiency of casting their ballots in favor of someone who has a lot to lose locally from nonperformance as their representative. Using precinct-level data from the 1998 election for the third congressional district in Alabama, we find compelling evidence in support of "home grown-ness" in politics. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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