Electoral Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy: The Evidence from Canada

Jac Heckelman

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 113, issue 1-2, 179-89

Abstract: The partisan advantage and incumbency advantage versions of the rational partisan business cycle model are tested. Both models assume agents form weighted averages of partisan inflation rates during an election period, and differ only in how the weights are formed which alters the form of business cycles. The partisan advantage assumes fixed weights designated for both major parties in each election, whereas the incumbency advantage model assumes fixed weights for whichever is the incumbent and opposition party in each election. The symmetric representation assumes each election is a toss-up. Strongest support is found for a temporary symmetric effect on the level of output, but none of the models are supported for temporary electoral changes in growth or unemployment rates. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:113:y:2002:i:1-2:p:179-89

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().