Budgetary Reform and Formal Modeling: A Comment on Gabel and Hager

David M Primo

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 113, issue 1-2, 225-30

Abstract: In a recent article, Gabel and Hager (2000) argue that the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment promote (BBA) and may increase pork-barrel spending. In their discussion of the balanced budget amendment, Gabel and Hager present one example to support their claim. I demonstrate that the effect of a BBA in their model is highly contingent on parameter values, and that their results hold only for a specific set of parameter values. Further, in a generalized model where the balanced budget amendment is crafted endogenously, the BBA that is enacted has the effect of either decreasing spending or keeping it constant. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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