Free Riding in State Legislatures

James R Rogers

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 113, issue 1-2, 59-76

Abstract: This paper applies the theory of team production to the legislative process and tests the empirical implications of that theory using a unique state-level data set. Empirically testable hypotheses are derived from the theory, including predictions that free riding will increase as chamber (or majority) size increases, and that legislative institutions (such as committee structure and staffing levels) can mitigate free riding. The hypotheses are tested using a pooled state-level data set developed from the session laws of twenty-three state legislatures. The empirical results are consistent with the major hypotheses. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:113:y:2002:i:1-2:p:59-76

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().