Dictator, Loyal, and Opportunistic Agents: The Soviet Archives on Creating the Soviet Economic System

Eugenia Belova and Paul Gregory

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 113, issue 3-4, 265-86

Abstract: Studies of the mature Soviet economy focus on the structural weaknesses of rent seeking and corruption. Such an economy is presumed to perform better in its adolescent phase under a strong stationary-bandit dictator, dedicated to growth and able to control rent-seekers. We use the recently opened Soviet state and party archives to show the process that began in the 1930s of transforming the inner circle of the Soviet stationary bandit into a rent-seeking bureaucracy lacking long-term goals. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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