Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants

William E Stein

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 113, issue 3-4, 325-36

Abstract: This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetric contestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation of the rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. One of the N contestants is selected as the winner based on Tullock's (1980) probabilistic contest rule with constant returns to scale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtained and its consequences are investigated. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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