The Methodology of Contractarianism in Economics

Christian Muller

Public Choice, 2002, vol. 113, issue 3-4, 465-83

Abstract: The paper explores the methodology of hypothetical contractarianism as a means of justifying rules of social conduct. Formally, the contractarian argument has the logical structure of a familiar deductive-nomological (rational choice) explanation. It necessarily requires, however, that at least some premises used in its explanans be empirically false. It is argued that, in contrast to ordinary explanatory arguments, the contractarian thought experiment would be pointless if all assumptions were empirically true. As a consequence, even in the case that a given contract theory can be proven to be logically consistent, it fails to justify binding obligations of real individuals due to an insurmountable logical problem of induction. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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