Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness

Johan Lagerlof

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 114, issue 3-4, 319-47

Abstract: This paper develops a model of a two-candidate election in which the candidates are mainly office-motivated but also to some (arbitrarily small) extent policy-motivated, and their chosen platforms are to some (arbitrarily small) extent noisy. The platforms' being noisy means that if a candidate has chosen a particular platform, the voter's perception is that she has, with positive probability, actually chosen some other platform. It is shown that (i) an equilibrium in which the candidates play pure exists whether or not there is a Condorcet winner among the policy alternatives, and (ii) in this equilibrium the candidates choose their own favorite platforms, which means that the platforms do not converge. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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