The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative

Katharina Michaelowa ()

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 114, issue 3-4, 76 pages

Abstract: Only three years after its endorsement by the World Bank and the IMF, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)--Initiative was considerably altered and enhanced. This policy shift can be explained as a result of utility maximization behavior by national and international politicians, international bureaucrats and NGO. A politico-economic model suggests that the overall rise of HIPC default risk and the symbolic value of the year 2000 have been the two major determinants of changes in volume, eligibility, and conditionality requirements. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:114:y:2003:i:3-4:p:461-76

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().