Paradoxes of Voting Power in Dutch Politics

Adrian van Deemen and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 115, issue 1-2, 109-37

Abstract: In this paper we first evaluate thirteen seat distributions in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament by means of several indices of voting power. Subsequently, we search for the occurrence of the paradox of redistribution, the paradox of new members, and the paradox of large size for each power index. The indices used are the Shapley6AShubik index, the normalized Banzhaf index, the Penrose-Banzhaf index, the Holler index, and the Deegan-Packel index. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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