Amendment Rules in Constitutions

Francesco Giovannoni

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 115, issue 1-2, 37-61

Abstract: I study a formal model where the founder of a constitution determines the amendment rule that minimizes constitutional changes by a future lobbyist. The founder has to consider that too flexible an amendment rule will make constitutional change via amending too easy while too rigid an amendment rule will force the lobbyist to look for other ways to achieve change. I characterize the optimal amendment rule under two alternative formulations and study the comparative statics with respect to the relative costs of amending and the other possibilities for change. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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