The Tax Revolt and Electoral Competition

Samuel H Baker

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 115, issue 3-4, 333-45

Abstract: This paper explores the effect of electoral competition on state and local expenditures in the US during the political environment following the tax revolt of the late 1970s. It utilizes a theoretical model in which both electoral competition and tax and expenditure limits impact spending. Empirical results indicate the tax revolt's primary impact was transmitted through political candidate competition, not through the adoption of tax or expenditure limitations, as is commonly believed. However, tax and expenditure limits do affect public education expenditures. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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