The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models

Randall Holcombe

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 116, issue 1-2, 19-29

Abstract: The size of the Pareto set in the issue space of spatial voting models is a function of the tax prices that voters are charged. When all voters pay Lindahl prices for all goods, the Pareto set collapses to a single point. The Pareto set can be enlarged by altering tax shares so they are further from Lindahl prices, and can be reduced by moving toward Lindahl pricing. A smaller Pareto set moves voters closer to consensus on issues, so reduces political decisionmaking costs and makes the political system more stable. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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