The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote

Casey Mulligan and Charles G Hunter

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 116, issue 1-2, 54 pages

Abstract: Some economic theories of voting suggest that competition leads to close elections, and that election closeness is a factor for bringing voters to the polls. How often in fact are civic elections decided by one vote? One of every 89,000 votes cast in U.S. Congressional elections, and one of 15,000 in state legislator elections, "mattered" in the sense that they were cast for a candidate that tied or won by one vote. We find an inverse relationship between election size and the frequency of one vote margins. Recounts, and other margin-specific election procedures, are determinants of the pivotal vote frequency. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote (2001)
Working Paper: The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote (2000)
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