Crime, Confiscation, and Frowth: For and Against Leviathan

Russell D. Murphy, Jr. ()

Public Choice, 2004, vol. 118, issue 3_4, 325-340

Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of rent seeking in which the payoffs and the choices between productive and non-productive activity are endogenous. The economy has the potential for endogenous growth, but when agents can choose between confiscation and productive investment, growth is no longer possible.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:118:y:2004:i:3_4:p:325-340

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().