Majority Support for Progressive Income Taxation with Corner Preferences
Philippe De Donder () and
Jean Hindriks ()
Public Choice, 2004, vol. 118, issue 3_4, 437-449
This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when income is fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasible taxes is compact and self-interested voters have corner preferences. We first show that, if a majority winning tax policy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then give a necessary and sufficient condition on the income distribution for a majority winner to exist. This condition appears to be satisfied for a large class of distribution functions.
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Working Paper: Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences (2004)
Working Paper: Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences (2003)
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