Blood, Baath and Beyond: the Constitutional Dilemma of Iraq

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Public Choice, 2004, vol. 119, issue 1_2, 13-30

Abstract: The constitutional choice facing Iraq is addressed by drawing upon insights from public choice theory and constitutional economics. Whether the one or the other constitutional framework is adopted may potentially have important long-term consequences for the country and the region. The U.S. administration's decision to revise its initial strategy, so as now to proceed with elections before putting a constitutional framework in place seems to get things wrong and is potentially a recipe for long-term disaster.

Date: 2004
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