Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test

Norman Frohlich (), Joe Oppenheimer () and Anja Kurki ()

Public Choice, 2004, vol. 119, issue 1_2, 117 pages

Abstract: Behavior inconsistent with self-interest has been observed in many contexts. We argue that models designed to cope with these anomalies are inadequate to deal with a variety of social values. Our extension of the Fehr & Schmidt `inequity aversion' model is applied to results from dictator experiments in which the money to be divided is generated by the efforts of paired individuals in either one or two rooms. This production leads to sharing behavior qualitatively different from that found in other dictator experiments. The pattern of sharing can be explained by entitlements, equity, and the credibility of the experiment.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (125)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:119:y:2004:i:1_2:p:91-117

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().