Environmental Policy, Public Interest and Political Market

Georges A. Tanguay (), Paul Lanoie and Jérôme Moreau

Public Choice, 2004, vol. 120, issue 1_2, 27 pages

Abstract: In this paper, we highlight the factors which influence governments in their decision to implement environmental policies of varying degrees of severity. We substantiate our arguments with analytical evidence from the public interest theory and the economic theory of regulation (``interest group theory''). We show, through empirical analysis based on the policies of 22 OECD countries, that pressure groups have sufficient impact on environmental regulation so that the economic theory predominates over the public interest theory.

Date: 2004
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