A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

Annick Laruelle () and Federico Valenciano ()

Public Choice, 2005, vol. 125, issue 1, 17-41

Abstract: Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed ‘natural’ postulates that a measure of a priori voting power ‘should’ satisfy, the violations of which are called ‘voting power paradoxes.’ In this paper two general measures of success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and voters' behavior and some of these postulates/paradoxes test each other. As a result serious doubts are cast on the discriminating power of most voting power postulates. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes (2005)
Working Paper: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF SOME VOTING POWER PARADOXES (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3408-5

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