EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Interest group size dynamics and policymaking

Vjollca Sadiraj (), Jan Tuinstra () and Frans Winden

Public Choice, 2005, vol. 125, issue 3, 303 pages

Abstract: We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking. The model integrates ‘top-down' (policy) and `bottom-up' (individual and social-structural) influences on the development of interest groups. Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of fixed-sized interest groups can be misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can also be misleading since equilibria may be unstable. Complicated dynamics may then emerge naturally, leading to erratic time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. Our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational density reported in empirical studies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-4599-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Interest Group Size Dynamics and Policymaking (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:271-303

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-4599-5

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2020-08-12
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:271-303