Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis

Russell Sobel and Peter Leeson

Public Choice, 2006, vol. 127, issue 1, 55-73

Abstract: We use public choice theory to explain the failure of FEMA and other governmental agencies to carry out effective disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The areas in which we focus are: (1) the tragedy of the anti-commons resulting from layered bureaucracy, (2) a type-two error policy bias causing over cautiousness in decision making, (3) the political manipulation of disaster declarations and relief aid to win votes, (4) the problem of acquiring timely and accurate preference revelations, (5) glory seeking by government officials, and (6) the shortsightedness effect causing a bias in governmental decision making. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (119)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-7730-3

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