Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy

Peter Nedergaard

Public Choice, 2006, vol. 127, issue 3, 385-405

Abstract: Economic theory has tried to explain the characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy inductively on the basis of certain economic peculiarities of agriculture. However, by overlooking the so–called government failures of the political system as an independent variable in explaining the Common Agricultural Policy it is impossible to explain, for example, the strong agricultural lobbyism. The deductive theoretical model of this article integrates economic as well as political actors in order to explain the characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy. The proposed theoretical model is not “tested”, but the criteria for such a test are presented. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-9000-1

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