Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model
Bryan Caplan ()
Public Choice, 2006, vol. 128, issue 1, 91-107
Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006
Keywords: Terrorism; Irrationality; Paradox of revolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:1:p:91-107
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