Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?

Burton Abrams and Plamen Iossifov
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Пламен Йосифов

Public Choice, 2006, vol. 129, issue 3, 249-262

Abstract: In contrast to findings of other studies, evidence is presented to support the existence of a Federal Reserve-induced political monetary cycle that corresponds to the U.S. presidential election cycle. Using various Taylor rules, we find support for the view that Fed policy turns significantly more expansionary in the seven quarters prior to the election, but only when the Fed chair and incumbent presidential party have partisan affiliations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:249-262

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9017-0

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