Note on rent-seeking and committees using a proportionate-sharing rule

Alan Lockard ()

Public Choice, 2006, vol. 129, issue 3, 315-319

Abstract: The paper examines how the effort expended in pursuit of rents may be affected by having the rents awarded by either an individual or a committee, under differing allocation rules. Congleton (1984) found that rent-seeking efforts should be markedly lower when rents are awarded by committees rather than by a single administrator. This paper reexamines the proportionate-sharing rule, and finds that, depending on decision-making norms followed by committee members, allocation by committee may result in rent-seeking expenditures that are less than, equal to, or greater than those where rents are proportionately divided by a single administrator. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9031-2

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