The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court

Saul Brenner, Joseph Whitmeyer () and Harold Spaeth

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, issue 1, 225-237

Abstract: We investigate whether the substantial use of the outcome-prediction strategy by Supreme Court justices occurs in the petitions denied certiorari by the Court. We show with a computer simulation that [Caldeira, G.A., Wright, J.R., & Zorn, C.J.W. (1999). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15, 549–572], who modeled the missing final votes for denied petitions in order to include them in their study of the use of the outcome-prediction strategy, may have obtained spurious results. Application of the logic of conditional probabilities to the denied petitions suggests that all but those denied by the narrowest of margins are probably considered unacceptable by the justices on non-outcome-oriented grounds, and, therefore, are not subject to use of this strategy. We evaluate the pursuit of the outcome-prediction strategy in petitions that narrowly fail to be granted cert by focusing upon the petitions that are narrowly granted cert and find limited use of the strategy. We conclude that the outcome-prediction strategy probably is little used by the justices in confronting the petitions denied cert and that investigations of the use of this strategy are best confined to those petitions granted cert. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Keywords: U.S. Supreme Court; Certiorari; Strategic behavior; Attitudinal model; Rational choice; Selection bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9082-4

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