1 dictator=2 voters

Antonio Quesada

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, issue 3, 395-400

Abstract: For the case of strict preferences, a measure of a voter’s average power in a dictatorial social welfare function is defined making the dictator never have more average power than three voters and, as the number of voters grows, making the dictator average power converge to the average power of two voters. This result suggests, as those in Tangian (2004), that dictatorial social welfare functions might not be as undesirable aggregation rules as traditionally held. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Arrow’s theorem; Social welfare function; Strict preference; Voters’ power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9094-0

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