EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

Edward Lopez and R. Jewell ()

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 132, issue 1, 137-157

Abstract: States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Term limits; Political institutions; Federalism; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9139-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:137-157

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9139-4

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2023-11-13
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:137-157