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Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis

Roland Vaubel (), Axel Dreher and Ugurlu Soylu ()

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 133, issue 3, 275-295

Keywords: International organizations; Bureaucracy; Principal-agent problem; Membership size; Partisan policies; F 02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis (2003) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9188-3

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