Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy

Marco Pani ()

Public Choice, 2011, vol. 148, issue 1, 163-196

Keywords: Corruption; Political equilibrium; Public goods; Public expenditure; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9651-4

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