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Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?

Barbara Luppi () and Francesco Parisi ()

Public Choice, 2012, vol. 152, issue 1, 201 pages

Keywords: Efficiency of the common law hypothesis; Gordon Tullock; Rent-seeking; English rule; American rule; B31; D72; K10; K12; K13; K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9860-5

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